PQC migration checkpoints of shared services

The checkpoints a post-quantum migration of a shared service goes through, who owns each one by role, what it waits for, the kind of each date and what a slip would delay. External prerequisites such as standards and industry rules carry their real status from recorded sources.

Reference model, not an agreed plan. No participant has agreed this plan and no coordination governance exists, so no checkpoint is agreed, no date is participant-agreed and no operational board is active. Participant checkpoints are proposed and undated. Owners are roles, never people. Not compliance advice.

Choose a reference service

Proposed, agreed and completed: Code signing and firmware updates from a supplier to an operator's devices

10 checkpoints: 8 proposed, 0 agreed, 2 completed.

Nothing is agreed: no governance between participants exists. Completed checkpoints are external prerequisites whose completion a recorded source shows.

Planned dates by kind

Unknown: no date published or agreed: 8
Vendor roadmap date: 0
Official guidance target: 2
Verified legal obligation: 0
Participant-agreed date: 0

Readiness of the components and the action plan of this service

Checkpoint board

Stages give an order, not a schedule: a checkpoint is in a later stage than everything it waits for. Checkpoints in one stage can run in parallel; checkpoints that wait for each other share a stage and are agreed together.

Checkpoints of the service with owner, dependencies, dates, state and evidence
Stage	Checkpoint	Owner (role)	Depends on	Planned date and its kind	State	Completed	Acceptance evidence	Blocker	Next review	A slip affects
Stage 1	Leighton-Micali hash-based signatures specified External prerequisite	Standards body or supervisor (outside the plan)	Nothing	Unknown: no date published or agreed	Completed	2019-04: RFC 8554, Informational, April 2019.	A published specification. RFC 8554: Leighton-Micali Hash-Based Signatures (Informational, April 2019; read 2026-10-23)	Nothing	No review cycle agreed	8 checkpoints
Stage 1	Inventory of device models, their boot verifiers and update paths Participant checkpoint	Own organisation	Nothing	Official guidance target: 2026-12-31 EU roadmap first steps, which include inventories, by the end of 2026: a guidance target, not a legal deadline. EU roadmap milestone 1: first steps and national roadmaps	Proposed Can start: nothing it depends on is open	Not completed	Device models, firmware lines and whether the verifier can be updated, recorded per model.	Nothing	No review cycle agreed	6 checkpoints
Stage 2	NIST recommendation for stateful hash-based signatures External prerequisite	Standards body or supervisor (outside the plan)	Leighton-Micali hash-based signatures specified	Unknown: no date published or agreed	Completed	2020-10: NIST SP 800-208, final, October 2020.	A final recommendation. NIST SP 800-208: Recommendation for Stateful Hash-Based Signature Schemes (Final, October 2020; read 2026-10-23)	Nothing	No review cycle agreed	7 checkpoints
Stage 3; agreed together with Device verifier update that accepts the new signatures	New code-signing trust anchor and parameter set chosen Participant checkpoint · Code-signing certificate or trust anchor	Certificate authority or trust service provider	NIST recommendation for stateful hash-based signatures; Device verifier update that accepts the new signatures	Unknown: no date published or agreed	Proposed Can start: nothing it depends on is open	Not completed	The algorithm, parameter set and anchor recorded and accepted by the device verifier.	Nothing	No review cycle agreed	5 checkpoints
Stage 3; agreed together with New code-signing trust anchor and parameter set chosen	Device verifier update that accepts the new signatures Participant checkpoint · Bootloaders and update agents verifying signatures on the devices	Supplier or vendor	Inventory of device models, their boot verifiers and update paths; New code-signing trust anchor and parameter set chosen	Unknown: no date published or agreed	Proposed Waiting for open dependencies	Not completed	A verifier release per device model, tested with signatures under the new anchor.	Nothing	No review cycle agreed	5 checkpoints
Stage 3	Signing HSM with state management for hash-based keys Participant checkpoint · Supplier's signing HSM	Supplier or vendor	NIST recommendation for stateful hash-based signatures	Unknown: no date published or agreed	Proposed Can start: nothing it depends on is open	Not completed	The HSM release and how it prevents state reuse, recorded with its evidence.	Nothing	No review cycle agreed	4 checkpoints
Stage 4	Images signed with both the classical and the new key during transition Participant checkpoint · Signing library in the supplier's build pipeline	Supplier or vendor	Signing HSM with state management for hash-based keys; New code-signing trust anchor and parameter set chosen	Unknown: no date published or agreed	Proposed Waiting for open dependencies	Not completed	Signed test images that old and updated verifiers both accept.	Nothing	No review cycle agreed	3 checkpoints
Stage 5	Operator acceptance test on representative devices Participant checkpoint · Operator's acceptance and rollout of updates with new signatures	Own organisation	Images signed with both the classical and the new key during transition; Device verifier update that accepts the new signatures	Unknown: no date published or agreed	Proposed Waiting for open dependencies	Not completed	A test record per device model, including recovery from a failed update.	Nothing	No review cycle agreed	2 checkpoints
Stage 6	Staged distribution of updates signed with the new key Participant checkpoint	All parties of the service jointly	Operator acceptance test on representative devices	Official guidance target: 2030-12-31 EU roadmap target by the end of 2030 for high-risk use cases and for quantum-safe firmware upgrades enabled by default: a guidance target, not a legal deadline. EU roadmap milestone 2: high-risk use cases migrated	Proposed Waiting for open dependencies	Not completed	The share of devices verifying the new signature, by model.	Nothing	No review cycle agreed	1 checkpoint
Stage 7	Classical signatures no longer accepted, when the operator authorises it Participant checkpoint	All parties of the service jointly	Staged distribution of updates signed with the new key	Unknown: no date published or agreed	Proposed Waiting for open dependencies	Not completed	A recorded authorisation and a plan for devices whose verifier cannot be updated.	Devices whose verifier cannot be updated keep needing classical signatures until they are replaced.	No review cycle agreed	0 checkpoints

Mutual dependencies and parallel work

Checkpoints that wait for each other

They have no order between them: the parties agree them together. No date is derived for them.

New code-signing trust anchor and parameter set chosen; Device verifier update that accepts the new signatures

Checkpoints that can start now, in parallel

Stage 3: New code-signing trust anchor and parameter set chosen; Signing HSM with state management for hash-based keys

If a checkpoint slips

Choose a checkpoint to see every checkpoint that waits for it, directly or further down. The portal does not compute new dates: where an affected checkpoint has a dated target, that target may no longer hold.

Kinds of date, kept apart

Unknown: no date published or agreed: Nothing published or agreed. Unknown dates stay unknown; the portal never fills them in.
Vendor roadmap date: A target a supplier announced for a release. A roadmap is not a release; shown only once an editor approved the vendor evidence in the product navigator.
Official guidance target: A date an authority sets as guidance, as the PQC migration timeline records it. Not a legal deadline and not agreed between the parties.
Verified legal obligation: A date a recorded legal act sets. None of the reference services has one.
Participant-agreed date: A date the parties of a service agreed. None exists: this is a reference model.