PQC product navigator
Check the post-quantum readiness of the products you use and build a migration plan.
Post-quantum cryptography: what it is, what the rules say, what to do by when
What post-quantum cryptography is about, what the published EU documents and national agencies ask, and by when, in the portal’s own words with a source for every statement. It complements the dated milestones of the PQC migration timeline.
Not legal or compliance advice. The texts below summarise official documents as they read on the date shown; check the publisher for the authoritative, current version before relying on them.
A guide to post-quantum cryptography in the portal's own words, compiled from official pages and documents of EUR-Lex, the European Commission, the NIS Cooperation Group, ENISA, BSI, ANSSI, the AIVD, NIST, ETSI and the national agencies of the Member States on the date shown; each locator says where the fact was read. Dates are given only when a published text sets them, and an EU law is said to name post-quantum cryptography only if its text does. National records list only official agency or government pages; a page that could not be read is marked not verified with the reason. Not legal or compliance advice: check the publisher for the authoritative current version. Owner-reviewed for demonstration, 28 October 2026. Compiled 2026-10-27.
PQC tools
PQC migration timeline
Dated EU and national milestones for the move to post-quantum cryptography.
Compliance calendar
Obligations and deadlines by organisation type, with a calendar feed.
PQC transition coordination
Coordinate a shared migration service across organisations.
What is due when
Standards and PQC deadlines in date order.
Standards and PQC guidance
Standards bodies, references and the standards deadline tracker.
The issue in plain language
Harvest now, decrypt later
An attacker can record encrypted traffic or stored data today and keep it until a quantum computer strong enough to break today's public-key cryptography exists. Data that must stay confidential for many years is therefore already exposed, although no such quantum computer is known to exist yet.
Source: NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 1, Executive Summary, first paragraph; section 2, the first of two threat scenarios); ENISA: Post-Quantum Cryptography, Current state and quantum mitigation (v2, May 2021) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 1, Introduction: retrospective decryption of intercepted ciphertext); ECCG: Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms, version 2 (EUCC guidelines on cryptography, applicable version of 6 May 2025) (retrieved 2026-10-27; Section 1.4, Post-Quantum Cryptography: harvest now, decrypt later, and early action for long-term confidentiality and long-lived products)
The EU roadmap and the national agencies call this scenario store now, decrypt later and treat it as the main reason to act now. The roadmap counts a use case as high risk when data protected by public-key cryptography would still cause significant damage if decrypted ten years or more from now.
Source: NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 4.2, point 2: definition of high-risk use cases); BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.11.2024) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Page 1, two main threat scenarios; page 2, protection of the most sensitive use cases)
A second concern is time. Moving complex systems such as public-key infrastructures, or devices with a long lifetime, can take many years, so a transition that starts late may not finish before such a quantum computer appears.
Source: NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 2, the second threat scenario, long transition periods); BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.11.2024) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Page 1, second threat scenario, long migration periods)
What is affected, and what much less
A large quantum computer running Shor's algorithm would break the public-key methods in wide use today, such as RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography. Those methods do two jobs: key exchange, which agrees the keys that then encrypt a connection, and digital signatures, which show who signed and that nothing was changed.
Source: ENISA: Post-Quantum Cryptography, Current state and quantum mitigation (v2, May 2021) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 1, Introduction, first paragraph: Shor breaks RSA, ECC and finite-field discrete logarithms); BSI: Quantum Technologies and Quantum-Safe Cryptography (retrieved 2026-10-21; Page text: public-key cryptography threatened, key agreement first, then long-lived signature keys); BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.11.2024) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Page 1, first paragraph: RSA and ECC broken by Shor's algorithm on a fault-tolerant quantum computer)
Symmetric encryption such as AES is affected much less: the known quantum attack, Grover's algorithm, roughly halves its security level, which longer keys such as AES-256 make up for. Quantum computers are not expected to speed up generic attacks on cryptographic hash functions by more than a square-root factor either.
Source: ENISA: Post-Quantum Cryptography, Current state and quantum mitigation (v2, May 2021) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 1, Introduction, second paragraph on symmetric cryptography and Grover; section 2.3, Hash-based, on generic attacks against hash functions); ANSSI: ANSSI views on the Post-Quantum Cryptography transition (2023 follow up), December 21, 2023 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 1.3, Symmetric cryptography: AES-256 and SHA2-384 levels as a conservative measure)
NIST published the first replacement standards on 13 August 2024: FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) for key establishment, and FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA) for digital signatures. The EU roadmap and the national agencies recommend combining post-quantum methods with today's methods, a hybrid approach, wherever feasible.
Source: NIST CSRC: FIPS 203 (Final) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Publication page: date August 13, 2024; abstract on ML-KEM for key establishment); NIST CSRC: FIPS 204 (Final) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Publication page: date August 13, 2024; abstract on ML-DSA digital signatures); NIST CSRC: FIPS 205 (Final) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Publication page: date August 13, 2024; abstract on SLH-DSA digital signatures); NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 4.1, standardised and tested hybrid solutions whenever feasible and suitable); BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.11.2024) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Page 1: PQC in hybrid solutions for most use cases); ANSSI: ANSSI views on the Post-Quantum Cryptography transition (2023 follow up), December 21, 2023 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 1.1, Hybridation, and section 1.2, Transition strategy); ECCG: Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms, version 2 (EUCC guidelines on cryptography, applicable version of 6 May 2025) (retrieved 2026-10-27; Section 1.4, Post-Quantum Cryptography: post-quantum mechanisms rolled out in hybrid mode alongside classical ones, so that all combined mechanisms must be broken)
Crypto-agility and inventories
The first step everywhere is an inventory: which systems, products and data use cryptography, for what purpose and under whose responsibility, including suppliers and software updates. ETSI makes inventory compilation the first of three migration stages, and the EU roadmap calls keeping cryptographic inventories a no-regret move for every entity.
Source: ETSI TR 103 619 V1.1.1 (2020-07): Migration strategies and recommendations to Quantum Safe schemes (retrieved 2026-10-21; Clause 4, staged approach (inventory, migration plan, execution); clause 5.2, inventory compilation); NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 6.2, First Steps: support mature cryptographic asset management; include the supply chain); ENISA: Post-Quantum Cryptography, Current state and quantum mitigation (v2, May 2021) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 6, Quantum Mitigation: a catalogue of public-key use, including software updates and third-party products)
Crypto-agility means building systems so that their cryptographic algorithms and parameters can be replaced without redesigning them. The EU roadmap asks that products expected to be used beyond 2030 can be upgraded to post-quantum cryptography and that software and firmware updates are signed with quantum-safe signatures.
Source: ETSI TR 103 619 V1.1.1 (2020-07): Migration strategies and recommendations to Quantum Safe schemes (retrieved 2026-10-21; Clause 3.1, definition of crypto-agility); NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 3.2, definition of cryptographic agility; section 4.2, paragraph after the box Milestone 2, quantum-safe upgrade path); BSI: Quantum Technologies and Quantum-Safe Cryptography (retrieved 2026-10-21; Page text: crypto products should be made as flexible as possible (cryptographic agility)); AIVD, CWI and TNO: The PQC Migration Handbook, revised and extended second edition, December 2024 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 4.4, Cryptographic Agility, and sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2)
With the inventory in hand, an organisation can rank its systems by quantum risk, long-lived confidential data and hard-to-replace systems first, and plan the migration with its budget.
Source: BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.11.2024) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Page 2, the recommended steps: quantum threat analysis with an inventory, risk-oriented roadmap considering crypto-agility, migration plan with prioritisation and budget); NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 5, Estimating the quantum risk); AIVD, CWI and TNO: The PQC Migration Handbook, revised and extended second edition, December 2024 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 2.3, Cryptographic Asset Management, and section 2.4, Quantum Risk Assessment)
What the published documents ask, by when
One row per action that a published document asks for, with who it applies to, a date only when the text sets one, and whether the text names post-quantum cryptography at all. Most EU laws ask for state-of-the-art or appropriate cryptography without naming it; the table says so rather than reading more into them. Actions for all organisations are shown under every audience.
15 actions
| Action | Who it applies to | Date | Names PQC? | Source and locator |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Risk-management measures that include cryptography policies Member States had to apply their NIS2 rules from 18 October 2024, under which essential and important entities take risk-management measures that reflect the state of the art and include policies and procedures on the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption. On this portal: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (EU legal acts) | Essential and important entities under the national laws that transpose NIS2
| Applies from | No: it does not name post-quantum cryptography | EU regulation or directive: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), Article 21(1) and (2), point (h), and Article 41(1) Source: EUR-Lex: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Article 21(1), second subparagraph (state of the art); Article 21(2), point (h); Article 41(1), second subparagraph) |
| ICT security policies, protected keys and encryption From 17 January 2025, financial entities must keep ICT security policies that protect the authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of data at rest, in use and in transit, protect cryptographic keys, encrypt data according to data classification and ICT risk assessment, and monitor relevant technological developments. | Financial entities in scope of DORA
| Applies from | No: it does not name post-quantum cryptography | EU regulation or directive: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA), Articles 9(2), 9(4), point (d), 13(7) and 64 Source: EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 (DORA) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Article 9(2); Article 9(4), point (d); Article 13(7); Article 64, second paragraph) |
| First steps and an initial national PQC roadmap By 31 December 2026 every Member State should have taken the roadmap's first steps, among them stakeholder involvement, cryptographic inventories, dependency maps and a quantum risk analysis, set up an initial national PQC transition roadmap and started planning and pilots for high- and medium-risk use cases. On this portal: EU roadmap milestone 1: first steps and national roadmaps (PQC migration timeline); EU PQC Coordinated Implementation Roadmap (Part 1) (Standards and guidance) | Member States (national governments and their administrations)
| Target date Upcoming | Yes | Coordinated EU roadmap of the Member States: NIS Cooperation Group, Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to PQC, Part 1, version 1.1 Source: NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 4.1, timeline for the transition to PQC, point 1 (by 31.12.2026); section 4.2, box Milestone 1; section 6.2, First Steps) |
| Assess the effects of the PQC Recommendation Member States should assess the effects of Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101 together with the Commission at the latest three years after its publication, drawing on the work of the PQC sub-group, a deadline that EUR-Lex records as 12 April 2027. On this portal: Assessment of the PQC Recommendation due (PQC migration timeline); Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101 (Standards and guidance); Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101 (EU legal acts) | Member States, with the European Commission
| Review date Upcoming | Yes | Commission recommendation: Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101, point (11) Source: EUR-Lex: Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101, document information and text (retrieved 2026-10-21; Document information, dates: deadline 12/04/2027, review at the latest, see point 11; point (11), Review) |
| Products designed to the essential cybersecurity requirements From 11 December 2027, manufacturers must ensure that products with digital elements they place on the market meet the essential requirements, which, where applicable on the basis of the risk assessment, include protecting the confidentiality of data, for example by encrypting relevant data at rest or in transit with state-of-the-art mechanisms, and protecting its integrity. | Manufacturers placing products with digital elements on the EU market
| Applies from Upcoming | No: it does not name post-quantum cryptography | EU regulation or directive: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), Article 13(1), Article 71(2) and Annex I, Part I, point (2)(e) and (f) Source: EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Article 13(1); Article 71(2), first subparagraph; Annex I, Part I, point (2), points (e) and (f)) |
| Protect the most sensitive use cases National agencies of 18 Member States, and later partners from 21 European states, recommend protecting the most sensitive use cases against store-now-decrypt-later attacks as soon as possible and by the end of 2030 at the latest, with detailed transition plans for public-key infrastructures in the same timeframe. On this portal: Joint statement of national agencies: protect the most sensitive use cases by 2030 (PQC migration timeline) | Public administration, critical infrastructure providers, IT providers and all of industry, as the statement addresses them
| Target date Upcoming | Yes | Joint statement of national agencies: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (27.11.2024, reissued 27.06.2025) Source: BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.11.2024) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Page 1, addressees of the call to transition; page 2, paragraph on protecting the most sensitive use cases by the end of 2030); BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.06.2025) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Header: partners from 21 European states; same recommendation on page 2) |
| High-risk use cases moved to post-quantum cryptography By 31 December 2030 the roadmap's next steps should be taken, high-risk use cases moved to PQC and planning and pilots for medium-risk use cases completed; after 2030, quantum-vulnerable public-key mechanisms should not be used on their own for high-risk use cases. On this portal: EU roadmap milestone 2: high-risk use cases migrated (PQC migration timeline); EU PQC Coordinated Implementation Roadmap (Part 1) (Standards and guidance) | Member States; public administrations and other critical infrastructures, notably NIS2 entities, are asked to refer to the roadmap
| Target date Upcoming | Yes | Coordinated EU roadmap of the Member States: NIS Cooperation Group, Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to PQC, Part 1, version 1.1 Source: NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 3.1, Scope; section 4.1, paragraph on high-risk use cases after 2030 and timeline point 2 (by 31.12.2030); section 4.2, box Milestone 2) |
| Quantum-safe upgrades enabled by default The roadmap sets the end of 2030 for quantum-safe software and firmware upgrades to be enabled by default, and highly recommends that products entering the market with an expected lifetime beyond 2030 can be upgraded to PQC, with post-quantum signatures protecting their update mechanism. On this portal: EU roadmap milestone 2: high-risk use cases migrated (PQC migration timeline); EU PQC Coordinated Implementation Roadmap (Part 1) (Standards and guidance) | Manufacturers of products with an expected lifetime beyond 2030, as the roadmap addresses them
| Target date Upcoming | Yes | Coordinated EU roadmap of the Member States: NIS Cooperation Group, Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to PQC, Part 1, version 1.1 Source: NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 4.1, timeline point 2, upgrades enabled by default; section 4.2, paragraph after the box Milestone 2, quantum-safe upgrade path; section 6.3, Next Steps, cryptographic agility) |
| Medium-risk use cases moved to post-quantum cryptography By 31 December 2035 the transition of medium-risk use cases should be completed, and quantum-vulnerable public-key mechanisms should no longer be used on their own for them. On this portal: EU roadmap milestone 3: medium-risk use cases migrated (PQC migration timeline); EU PQC Coordinated Implementation Roadmap (Part 1) (Standards and guidance) | Member States; public administrations and other critical infrastructures, notably NIS2 entities, are asked to refer to the roadmap
| Target date Upcoming | Yes | Coordinated EU roadmap of the Member States: NIS Cooperation Group, Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to PQC, Part 1, version 1.1 Source: NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 4.1, paragraph on medium-risk use cases after 2035 and timeline point 3 (by 31.12.2035); section 4.2, point 3) |
| Low-risk use cases moved as far as feasible By 31 December 2035 the transition of low-risk use cases should also be completed, as far as feasible. On this portal: EU roadmap milestone 3: medium-risk use cases migrated (PQC migration timeline); EU PQC Coordinated Implementation Roadmap (Part 1) (Standards and guidance) | Member States; public administrations and other critical infrastructures, notably NIS2 entities, are asked to refer to the roadmap
| Target date Upcoming | Yes | Coordinated EU roadmap of the Member States: NIS Cooperation Group, Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to PQC, Part 1, version 1.1 Source: NIS Cooperation Group: A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, Part 1, version 1.1 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Section 4.1, timeline point 3, second item; section 4.2, point 3) |
| Start the transition now Organisations and governments should start now: analyse the quantum threat with an inventory of the assets to protect and the applications that use cryptography, draw up a risk-based roadmap that considers crypto-agility, and plan, prioritise and budget the migration. On this portal: Joint statement of national agencies: protect the most sensitive use cases by 2030 (PQC migration timeline) | Public administration, critical infrastructure providers, IT providers and all of industry, as the statement addresses them
| Start now; no date set | Yes | Joint statement of national agencies: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (27.11.2024, reissued 27.06.2025) Source: BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.11.2024) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Page 1, last paragraph, and page 2, the four recommended steps) |
| National policies on encryption in public procurement As part of its national cybersecurity strategy, each Member State must adopt policies on cybersecurity requirements for ICT products and services in public procurement, including requirements on encryption. On this portal: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (EU legal acts) | Member States, in their national cybersecurity strategy
| No date in this provision | No: it does not name post-quantum cryptography | EU regulation or directive: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), Article 7(2), point (b) Source: EUR-Lex: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Article 7, National cybersecurity strategy, paragraph 2, point (b)) |
| A cryptography policy with approved algorithms, reviewed against the state of the art Digital infrastructure and digital service providers named in the regulation, such as cloud, data centre, managed security and trust service providers, must set a cryptography policy that fixes approved protocols, algorithms and cipher strength, following a cryptographic agility approach where appropriate, and review it at planned intervals in the light of the state of the art. On this portal: Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (EU legal acts) | DNS, TLD, cloud, data centre, content delivery, managed and managed security service providers, online marketplaces, search engines, social networks and trust service providers under NIS2
| No date in these provisions | No: it does not name post-quantum cryptography | Commission delegated or implementing regulation: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690, Article 1 and Annex, points 9.1 to 9.3 Source: EUR-Lex: Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2024/2690 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Article 1, Subject matter; Annex, point 9 Cryptography, points 9.1, 9.2(b) and 9.3) |
| An encryption policy that keeps up with cryptanalysis Financial entities under the full ICT risk-management framework must have a policy on encryption and cryptographic controls that sets criteria for choosing techniques in line with leading practices and standards and provides for updating or changing the cryptographic technology as cryptanalysis develops, with mitigation and monitoring where that is not possible. | Financial entities covered by Title II of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774
| No date in this provision | No: it does not name post-quantum cryptography | Commission delegated or implementing regulation: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 (DORA ICT risk-management standards), Article 6 Source: EUR-Lex: Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2024/1774 (retrieved 2026-10-21; Recital (48); Title II, Section 4, Article 6(1) to (5), Encryption and cryptographic controls) |
| Suitable cryptographic techniques for qualified trust services Qualified trust service providers must use trustworthy systems and products, including suitable cryptographic techniques, while the recitals ask trust service providers to follow current best practice in cryptography and want the European Digital Identity Wallets that Member States provide to use state-of-the-art encryption. | Qualified trust service providers; Member States providing European Digital Identity Wallets (recitals)
| No date in these provisions | No: it does not name post-quantum cryptography | EU regulation or directive: Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 (eIDAS 2), Article 1, point (21), amending Article 24(2), point (e), of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014; recitals 31, 73 and 79 Source: EUR-Lex: Regulation (EU) 2024/1183 (eIDAS 2) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Article 1, point (21)(b)(ii), new Article 24(2), point (e); recitals (31), (73) and (79)) |
National status
One row per EU Member State: the national post-quantum guidance or roadmap published on an official national agency or government page, or none found on those pages on the date checked, or not verified when a page could not be read. The agency is the national cybersecurity or cryptography authority whose pages were checked; this is not a statement of its legal remit.
13 with published national guidance, 9 with none found on official pages, 5 not verified.
| Country | Status | National guidance or roadmap | National agency | On the PQC timeline |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Austria | None found on official pages (checked 2026-10-21)No national PQC guidance or roadmap was found on the Federal Chancellery pages. The Interior Ministry site hosts a sector analysis of PQC migration for electronic travel documents (status 7 May 2025), prepared with A-SIT Plus, which is not a national roadmap. The A-SIT site could not be loaded (connection failed). | None listed | Federal Chancellery of Austria (Bundeskanzleramt)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Belgium | National guidance or roadmap foundThe telecommunications regulator BIPT sets minimum requirements and a sector roadmap: inventory and risk analysis by 2027, planning by 2028 and implementation by 2030. The CCB site answered with an access denied page (HTTP 403), so CCB pages could not be checked. |
| Centre for Cybersecurity Belgium (CCB)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Bulgaria | None found on official pages (checked 2026-10-21)No PQC guidance was found on the CERT Bulgaria site, whose searches for quantum terms returned nothing. The Ministry of e-Government site could not be loaded (connection failed). | None listed | CERT Bulgaria (national computer security incident response team) | |
| Croatia | None found on official pages (checked 2026-10-21)No PQC guidance was found on the NCSC-HR documents, guidelines and recommendations pages or on the site of the Information Systems Security Bureau (ZSIS), whose search for quantum terms returned nothing. | None listed | National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-HR) | |
| Cyprus | None found on official pages (checked 2026-10-21)No PQC guidance was found on the Digital Security Authority site; its search for quantum terms only returned a news item on an ENISA forum. | None listed | Digital Security Authority (DSA) | |
| Czechia | National guidance or roadmap foundNÚKIB recommendations on cryptographic algorithms have a chapter on quantum-resistant asymmetric algorithms, with ML-KEM, hybrid key establishment and post-quantum signatures. |
| National Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Denmark | National guidance or roadmap foundThe former Centre for Cyber Security site now redirects to SAMSIK. Its page on the transition advises an inventory, risk assessment, hybrid algorithms for highly sensitive data and crypto-agility, without a national deadline. |
| Styrelsen for Samfundssikkerhed (SAMSIK)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Estonia | Not verified (checked 2026-10-27)The RIA site and the related id.ee portal answered with a bot challenge (HTTP 403), which was not bypassed, so their pages could not be read. Search results point to RIA reports on cryptographic algorithms and to a national PQC roadmap presented in 2026, none of which could be confirmed. Retried on 27 October 2026 with a plain request: still a bot challenge (HTTP 403 or a browser verification redirect), not bypassed. Next attempt: an editor in an ordinary browser at the next 30-day review, by 26 November 2026. | None listed | Information System Authority (Riigi Infosüsteemi Amet, RIA)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Finland | National guidance or roadmap foundA Traficom memo says the NIST post-quantum algorithms will join the national crypto criteria, recommends hybrid use and crypto-agility, and asks organisations to prepare a migration plan with an inventory and a risk assessment, without a national deadline. |
| Finnish Transport and Communications Agency, National Cyber Security Centre (Traficom NCSC-FI)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| France | National guidance or roadmap foundThe cyber.gouv.fr site answered with a CAPTCHA, which was not solved; the documents were read on ANSSI's own service platform. ANSSI considers hybridation necessary wherever post-quantum protection is needed and recommends hybrid post-quantum protection for products meant to protect information beyond 2030. |
| National Cybersecurity Agency of France (ANSSI)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Germany | National guidance or roadmap foundA joint guideline of the federal ministries BMDS and BMI and the BSI sets a German timeline aligned with the EU roadmap; BSI also publishes technical guideline TR-02102-1 and its page on quantum-safe cryptography. |
| Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Greece | None found on official pages (checked 2026-10-21)No PQC guidance or roadmap was found. The National Cybersecurity Strategy 2026 to 2030 discusses the quantum threat and the importance of the PQC transition without phases, dates or technical recommendations. | None listed | National Cyber Security Authority (Εθνική Αρχή Κυβερνοασφάλειας)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Hungary | None found on official pages (checked 2026-10-21)No PQC guidance was found; a 2024 overview report on cryptography only mentions that a hybrid approach will be needed, and site searches returned news items. | None listed | National Cyber Security Institute (Nemzeti Kibervédelmi Intézet, NKI)Signed the joint statement of 27 June 2025 | |
| Ireland | None found on official pages (checked 2026-10-21)No PQC guidance was found in the NCSC guidance list; its research and innovation priorities of November 2025 pose research questions on a national migration to quantum-resistant cryptography. | None listed | National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Italy | National guidance or roadmap foundACN publishes an introduction to post-quantum and quantum cryptography and cryptographic guidelines; its cryptography page lists them. No national transition roadmap was found. |
| National Cybersecurity Agency (Agenzia per la Cybersicurezza Nazionale, ACN)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Latvia | National guidance or roadmap foundThe national cryptography guidelines include a short recommendation to prepare for post-quantum cryptography with hybrid classical and post-quantum algorithms, without phases or dates. |
| National Cyber Security Centre of Latvia (Nacionālais kiberdrošības centrs, Ministry of Defence)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Lithuania | Not verified (checked 2026-10-27)The NKSC site and the Ministry of National Defence document answered with a bot challenge (HTTP 403), which was not bypassed, so they could not be read. Search results point to NKSC guidelines on the transition to post-quantum cryptography, which could not be confirmed. Retried on 27 October 2026 with a plain request: still a bot challenge (HTTP 403 or a browser verification redirect), not bypassed. Next attempt: an editor in an ordinary browser at the next 30-day review, by 26 November 2026. | None listed | National Cyber Security Centre (Nacionalinis kibernetinio saugumo centras, NKSC)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Luxembourg | None found on official pages (checked 2026-10-21)No agency PQC guidance was found on the HCPN or GOVCERT.LU pages. The government quantum strategy presented in May 2025 plans, in its action 10, a future national PQC roadmap, cryptographic inventories and migration guidelines, without dates. | None listed | High Commission for National Protection (HCPN)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Malta | Not verified (checked 2026-10-27)Every gov.mt site tried answered with a bot challenge (HTTP 403), which was not bypassed, so neither the competent body nor any PQC guidance could be checked. Retried on 27 October 2026 with a plain request: still a bot challenge (HTTP 403 or a browser verification redirect), not bypassed. Next attempt: an editor in an ordinary browser at the next 30-day review, by 26 November 2026. | None listed | Government of Malta (competent cybersecurity body not confirmed) | |
| Netherlands | National guidance or roadmap foundThe government-wide quantum strategy sets a PQC migration timeline for central government, from risk management by the end of 2026 to high-risk use cases by the end of 2030 and medium-risk ones by the end of 2035. The NCSC site showed a temporary unavailability notice, so its pages could not be read. |
| National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) and the Netherlands National Communications Security Agency within the AIVDSigned the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Poland | None found on official pages (checked 2026-10-21)No published PQC guidance or migration plan was found. The national cybersecurity strategy of March 2026 names migration to post-quantum cryptography as an objective, and the government plenipotentiary reports that work on a migration plan has started. | None listed | NASK National Research Institute (CERT Polska)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Portugal | Not verified (checked 2026-10-27)Every CNCS page answered with a browser verification challenge, which was not bypassed, so the site could not be read. Retried on 27 October 2026 with a plain request: still a bot challenge (HTTP 403 or a browser verification redirect), not bypassed. Next attempt: an editor in an ordinary browser at the next 30-day review, by 26 November 2026. | None listed | National Cybersecurity Centre (Centro Nacional de Cibersegurança, CNCS)Signed the joint statement of 27 June 2025 | |
| Romania | Not verified (checked 2026-10-27)The DNSC site answered with a bot challenge (HTTP 403), which was not bypassed, so it could not be read. Search results point to a DNSC guide on the transition to post-quantum cryptography, which could not be confirmed. Retried on 27 October 2026 with a plain request: still a bot challenge (HTTP 403 or a browser verification redirect), not bypassed. Next attempt: an editor in an ordinary browser at the next 30-day review, by 26 November 2026. | None listed | National Cyber Security Directorate (Directoratul Național de Securitate Cibernetică, DNSC) | |
| Slovakia | National guidance or roadmap foundRecommendations for cryptographic algorithms hosted by NBÚ include post-quantum key establishment, hybrid key exchange and post-quantum signatures, without phases or dates; the document does not name its publisher. |
| National Security Authority (Národný bezpečnostný úrad, NBÚ) | |
| Slovenia | National guidance or roadmap foundURSIV guidance on the transition to post-quantum cryptography restates the EU milestones of 2026, 2030 and 2035 and covers hybrid schemes and a cryptographic inventory. |
| Government Information Security Office (Urad Vlade RS za informacijsko varnost, URSIV)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Spain | National guidance or roadmap foundThe CCN good-practice guide sets a recommended calendar in five phases aligned with the EU roadmap, with high-risk use cases completed by December 2030 and medium-risk ones by December 2035. |
| National Cryptologic Centre (Centro Criptológico Nacional, CCN)Signed the joint statements of 27 November 2024 and 27 June 2025 | |
| Sweden | National guidance or roadmap foundThe NCSC national recommendations say the transition should be finished by the end of 2035, and by the end of 2030 in some sensitive cases, starting with management attention and an inventory. |
| National Cyber Security Centre Sweden (Nationellt cybersäkerhetscenter, NCSC, at FRA) |
Joint statements: Source: BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.11.2024) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Header: partners from 18 EU member states and the list of signing agencies, dated 27.11.2024); BSI: Securing Tomorrow, Today: Transitioning to Post-Quantum Cryptography (joint statement, 27.06.2025) (retrieved 2026-10-21; Header: partners from 21 European states and the list of signing agencies, dated 27.06.2025)
Post-quantum cryptography migration timeline · PQC product readiness and migration navigator · Coordinate a shared service across organisations · Quantum standards and guidance · EU legal acts on quantum · Download the guide as JSON
JRC and EU analysis
Reports and pages of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC). Identifiers are those of the JRC Publications Repository; the portal does not reproduce their data.
- Future Directions for Quantum Technology in Europe
Background analysis for the Quantum Europe Strategy: companies, patents, publications, supply chains, public funding and venture capital, by sector (communication including QKD, computing including simulation, sensing, and post-quantum cryptography).
- Post-Quantum Cryptography, the Journey so far and the Challenges Ahead
The threat quantum computers pose to current cryptography, the state of post-quantum cryptography and the challenges of migration.
Further reading
- Understanding Quantum Technologies 2025 (Olivier Ezratty, 8th edition, version 8.1 of 30 October 2025, arXiv:2111.15352 (v6), doi:10.48550/arXiv.2111.15352, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)See Part 4: Communications and sensing
- Understanding Quantum Technologies 2026 (Olivier Ezratty, 9th edition, version 9.0 of 17 October 2026 (latest edition))See Part 4: Communications and sensing
Olivier Ezratty, Understanding Quantum Technologies (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). Links only; no text of the book is reproduced on this portal.