PQC transition coordination for shared services

Post-quantum migration of a shared service needs every party in the chain: your own organisation, suppliers, counterparties, certificate authorities and network providers. Pick a reference service and, if you wish, the product release of each component to see what the reviewed evidence says, what blocks what, who must act and a shared action plan you can print or export.

A product that supports a post-quantum algorithm does not mean the service can migrate: every party must configure, test and agree it, and the fallback must be retired. The reference services are illustrative templates, not real estates, not an agreed plan and not a coordination body. Not compliance advice.

Choose a reference service

Qualified electronic signatures and seals with a qualified trust service provider

Illustrative template An organisation signs documents with qualified certificates from a qualified trust service provider, whose keys sit in a qualified signature creation device; recipients validate the signatures with their own software against the EU trusted lists.

Parties involved: Own organisation, Counterparty (the other organisation or its users), Certificate authority or trust service provider, Standards body or supervisor (outside the plan)

Limitations: A generic template. ETSI TS 119 312 lists post-quantum signature suites, but leaves migration dates to a document still being prepared; no date for qualified trust services is recorded here.

0 of 5 components have approved evidence that the chosen release is generally available.

The service is not shown as migrated or ready: even with every component available, the parties still have to agree the configuration, test the whole chain together, pilot, roll out, validate and retire the fallback.

Product releases, optional

Choose the release you run for each component, from the products of the PQC navigator. Readiness is read from the assertions an editor approved for that release; leave a component on Not chosen if you do not know.

Component chain and readiness

Components are listed with the ones they depend on first. A component is blocked while anything it depends on, directly or further up the chain, is not available. Components without dependencies can start in parallel.

Components of the service, their readiness and dependencies
Component	Controlled by	Chosen release	Readiness	Depends on	Blocked by	Evidence and note
Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM HSM key storage and operations	Certificate authority or trust service provider	Not chosen	No product release chosen	Nothing	Nothing	Device certification is a separate question that this page does not assess.
Profiles and migration rules for qualified services Certificate signatures	Standards body or supervisor (outside the plan)	Not chosen	No agreement recorded between the parties	Nothing	Nothing	Set by standards bodies and supervisors, not by the parties of this plan.
Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority PKI / CA certificate issuance	Certificate authority or trust service provider	Not chosen	No product release chosen	Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM; Profiles and migration rules for qualified services	Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM; Profiles and migration rules for qualified services	Issues the qualified certificates.
Signing application of the organisation Algorithms in the cryptographic API	Own organisation	Not chosen	No product release chosen	Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority	Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority; Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM; Profiles and migration rules for qualified services	Creates the signed documents.
Recipients' signature validation software Algorithms in the cryptographic API	Counterparty (the other organisation or its users)	Not chosen	No product release chosen	Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority	Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority; Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM; Profiles and migration rules for qualified services	Recipients must validate the new signatures, or hybrid signatures keep a classical one they can check.

Bottlenecks (not available, and other components wait for them)

Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM: blocks 3 other components
Profiles and migration rules for qualified services: blocks 3 other components
Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority: blocks 2 other components

Can start in parallel (no dependencies)

Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM; Profiles and migration rules for qualified services

Readiness, in words

Available in the chosen release (approved evidence)
Preview only in the chosen release
Announced roadmap only, no release
Explicitly unsupported for this function
No verified information for the chosen release
No product release chosen
Not covered by the product navigator
No agreement recorded between the parties

Protocol and standard requirements

The specifications each component has to follow, with their status on the day they were read. An Internet-Draft is work in progress, not a standard.

ETSI TS 119 312 V2.1.1: Electronic Signatures and Trust Infrastructures (ESI); Cryptographic Suites (ETSI)
Lists ML-DSA and SLH-DSA as recommended for signatures and seals, LMS and XMSS only where signing state can be strictly managed, and recommends hybrid use of ML-DSA; it leaves migration dates to a separate document still being prepared.
Published standard or specification; Technical Specification, version 2.1.1 of June 2026; read 2026-10-23 at: Clause 6.2.2.5 (ML-DSA), 6.2.2.6 (SLH-DSA), 6.2.2.7 (LMS and XMSS), 6.4 (hybrid schemes) and 8.5 (migration). Applies to: Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM; Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority; Profiles and migration rules for qualified services; Signing application of the organisation; Recipients' signature validation software.
RFC 9881: Algorithm Identifiers for the Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) in X.509 (IETF (RFC Editor))
Sets the identifiers and formats for ML-DSA in X.509 certificates and revocation lists, the basis for post-quantum certificate chains.
IETF RFC; Proposed Standard, published 2025; read 2026-10-23 at: RFC information page: title, status Proposed Standard, authors. Applies to: Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority.
RFC 9882: Use of the ML-DSA Signature Algorithm in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) (IETF (RFC Editor))
Sets the conventions for ML-DSA signatures in CMS, the container used by many code, document and e-mail signatures.
IETF RFC; Proposed Standard, published 2025; read 2026-10-23 at: RFC information page: title, status Proposed Standard, authors. Applies to: Signing application of the organisation; Recipients' signature validation software.

Interoperability evidence

Published test results with their exact scope. A passed test applies only to what was tested; it is not a certification and does not show that a service or an organisation is ready.

IETF PQC Hackathon: ML-DSA-65 X.509 certificate artifacts (IETF Hackathon pqc-certificates project)
Result
Passed within the stated scope
Scope
Parsing and verifying self-signed ML-DSA-65 certificate artifacts from 17 producers with 4 verifiers (Bouncy Castle, a composite reference implementation, OpenSSL and QUBIP Aurora): all 68 pairs passed.
Algorithms and formats
ML-DSA-65 (pure), X.509 certificates in the RFC 9881 format
Navigator products whose projects took part
Bouncy Castle for Java, Botan, OpenJDK (Java SE), OpenSSL, CryptoNext Quantum-Safe Library
Limitations
Artifact test, not a TLS handshake or a deployed service. The page names submitters, not product releases or builds, so it does not apply to a particular release listed here. Not a certification.
Results dated, read on
2026-10-06, 2026-10-23
Locator
Automated verification results, table ML-DSA-65-cert (2.16.840.1.101.3.4.3.18-cert): rows are producers, columns are parsers
IETF PQC Hackathon: ML-DSA-65 private key formats (IETF Hackathon pqc-certificates project)
Result
Failed within the stated scope
Scope
Reading ML-DSA-65 private key files with the OpenSSL parser: seed-format keys from 10 producers were accepted and those from 2 producers, Botan and one other submitter, were rejected; the same 2 failed the seed and expanded-key consistency check.
Algorithms and formats
ML-DSA-65 private keys (seed and expanded-key encodings)
Navigator products whose projects took part
OpenSSL, Botan
Limitations
The results page does not state why the files were rejected; the run logs are linked from the project index. Applies to the submitted artifacts only, not to a product release, and says nothing about certificates or signatures.
Results dated, read on
2026-10-06, 2026-10-23
Locator
Automated verification results, tables ML-DSA-65-seed and ML-DSA-65-consistent: column openssl

EU coordinated roadmap milestones

Target dates as the PQC migration timeline records them from their sources. They are authority guidance targets: not legal deadlines and not dates agreed between the parties of this service.

By 31 December 2026: EU roadmap milestone 1: first steps and national roadmaps
By the end of 2026 all Member States should have implemented at least the roadmap's first steps, established initial national transition roadmaps and started planning and pilots for high- and medium-risk use cases.
By 31 December 2030: EU roadmap milestone 2: high-risk use cases migrated
By the end of 2030 the roadmap's next steps should be implemented, high-risk use cases moved to post-quantum cryptography, planning and pilots for medium-risk use cases completed and quantum-safe software and firmware upgrades enabled by default.
By 31 December 2035: EU roadmap milestone 3: medium-risk use cases migrated
By the end of 2035 the transition of medium-risk use cases should be completed, and that of low-risk use cases as far as feasible.

What the PQC guide lists for this kind of service

Suitable cryptographic techniques for qualified trust services (No date in these provisions)
First steps and an initial national PQC roadmap (By 31 December 2026)

National PQC guidance by Member State

Shared action plan

One action per component for the party that controls it, then the steps all parties take together. Dates are unknown unless a supplier published one; no date here is agreed. To print, use your browser’s print command: the page prints without menus.

Own organisation

Action plan of Own organisation
Checkpoint	Action	Component	State	Waits for	Date
Inventory and scope confirmed	Identify the product and release used for Signing application of the organisation and record it.	Signing application of the organisation	Waiting for the items listed	Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority	Unknown: no date published or agreed

Counterparty (the other organisation or its users)

Action plan of Counterparty (the other organisation or its users)
Checkpoint	Action	Component	State	Waits for	Date
Inventory and scope confirmed	Identify the product and release used for Recipients' signature validation software and record it.	Recipients' signature validation software	Waiting for the items listed	Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority	Unknown: no date published or agreed

Certificate authority or trust service provider

Action plan of Certificate authority or trust service provider
Checkpoint	Action	Component	State	Waits for	Date
Inventory and scope confirmed	Identify the product and release used for Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM and record it.	Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM	Can start now	Nothing	Unknown: no date published or agreed
Inventory and scope confirmed	Identify the product and release used for Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority and record it.	Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority	Waiting for the items listed	Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM; Profiles and migration rules for qualified services	Unknown: no date published or agreed

All parties of the service jointly

Action plan of All parties of the service jointly
Checkpoint	Action	Component	State	Waits for	Date
Interoperability test	Run a joint interoperability test of the whole chain in a test environment and record its scope and result.	Whole service	Waiting for the items listed	Qualified signature creation device or remote signing HSM; Profiles and migration rules for qualified services; Qualified trust service provider's certificate authority; Signing application of the organisation; Recipients' signature validation software	Unknown: no date published or agreed
Pilot	Pilot the service with a limited group, keeping the classical fallback.	Whole service	Waiting for the items listed	Interoperability test	Unknown: no date published or agreed
Staged rollout	Roll out in stages agreed by every party.	Whole service	Waiting for the items listed	Pilot	Unknown: no date published or agreed
Validation	Validate that the post-quantum mechanisms are actually negotiated or verified on every hop.	Whole service	Waiting for the items listed	Staged rollout	Unknown: no date published or agreed
Retirement of the legacy fallback, when authorised	Retire the classical-only fallback only when every party has authorised it.	Whole service	Waiting for the items listed	Validation	Unknown: no date published or agreed

Standards body or supervisor (outside the plan)

Action plan of Standards body or supervisor (outside the plan)
Checkpoint	Action	Component	State	Waits for	Date
Compatible configuration agreed	Agree Profiles and migration rules for qualified services between the parties concerned and record who agreed and when.	Profiles and migration rules for qualified services	Can start now	Nothing	Unknown: no date published or agreed

Download the action plan as CSV · Download the chain and the plan as JSON

The exports contain only the service, the releases chosen above and the public evidence. Nothing is stored.

PQC product navigator: readiness evidence by product release · PQC guide: what the rules say · PQC milestones and deadlines · EU legal acts on quantum · Document library

Illustrative reference services for coordinating a post-quantum migration across organisations (#471, first pilot). Each service is a generic chain of components with the role that controls each one; product readiness comes only from the editor-approved assertions of the PQC product navigator, never from this file. Requirement and interoperability sources were read on 23 October 2026 on the publishers' own pages; summaries are the portal's own words. Not a coordination body, not an agreed plan, not compliance advice. Reference services compiled 2026-10-23.