Report

Group report summarising academic and industrial understanding of quantum-safe cryptography as it stood in 2016. It identifies candidate primitives for key establishment and authentication that could be standardised by ETSI, sets out the primitive types under consideration and a framework for assessing them, discusses representative schemes in turn, and closes with a preliminary look at key sizes.

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Discusses hybrid cryptography that pairs traditional and post-quantum algorithms for key establishment and digital signatures. The report explains motivations for hybrids, clarifies the terminology, weighs security, efficiency and agility trade-offs, highlights factors in choosing algorithm and parameter combinations, covers deployment and migration issues, and identifies when hybrids should give way to purely post-quantum algorithms. It explicitly does not advise whether hybrids should be used.

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Reviews how an attacker with a cryptographically relevant quantum computer affects the security proofs of cryptographic protocols that run on classical hardware. For each affected system it classifies the situation: a quantum-aware replacement proof exists, possibly with lower security; security is still expected without a new proof; a break is expected though no concrete attack is known; or a concrete quantum attack already defeats it.

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Study of cryptographic protection in Intelligent Transport Systems and Cooperative ITS, assessing how exposed the deployed security mechanisms are to attack by a quantum computer. It reviews the current state of cryptographic deployment in vehicle and roadside communication and sets out recommendations for adopting quantum-safe cryptography so that these transport systems reduce their exposure.

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Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2023. All rights reserved.

Addresses the practical risks of stateful hash-based signature schemes, whose security depends on never reusing a state index. The report characterises the state object and the vulnerabilities and operational failures that poor state handling can cause, offers guidance on mitigating them, and helps implementers judge whether such a scheme fits their application, with examples of suitable and unsuitable deployments.

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Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2021. All rights reserved.

Proposes a quantum-safe hierarchical identity-based encryption scheme built on structured lattices. The report explains what hierarchical identity-based encryption offers, gives example use cases, and sketches the proposed construction at a high level, including concrete parameter sets, software performance estimates and a practical analysis of its security.

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Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2019. All rights reserved.

Examines what is needed to make virtual private network technologies resistant to quantum attack, covering client, server and architectural aspects with a focus on protocols and key establishment. The report explains that RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography rely on problems a quantum computer could solve efficiently, notes the immediate risk of traffic being recorded now and decrypted later, and argues VPN systems need updating before such machines exist.

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Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2018. All rights reserved.

Compares several quantum-safe key exchange proposals drawn from academic research, including schemes based on Learning with Errors, Ring-LWE and supersingular isogenies, and key exchanges built from Niederreiter and NTRU key transport. For each it outlines the construction, suggested parameters and software performance on different processors, and it discusses security and implementation concerns such as active attacks and side-channel leakage.

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Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2017. All rights reserved.

Companion to TR 103 616, this report gives concise technical descriptions of the public-key encryption schemes and key encapsulation mechanisms still in the third round of the NIST post-quantum process. It recounts how the NIST competition narrowed its candidate pool across rounds and describes the four finalists, Classic McEliece, KYBER, NTRU and SABER, together with the alternate candidates.

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Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2021. All rights reserved.

Technical report describing the digital signature algorithms that reached the third round of the NIST post-quantum standardisation process. It covers the three finalists (Dilithium, FALCON and Rainbow) and the alternate candidates (GeMSS, Picnic and SPHINCS+), giving for each the public parameters, key generation, signing and verification steps and performance figures, with annexes on security properties, signature construction frameworks and recent cryptanalysis results.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2021. All rights reserved.