Report

First edition of QuantERA's mapping of national quantum technology policies, compiled in summer 2020 from factsheets prepared by consortium research funding organisations. It summarises funding instruments, research priority areas and dedicated national programmes such as those in Austria, Germany, Hungary, Israel, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, then presents country-by-country profiles of funders and research communities. It notes that two QuantERA calls pooled roughly 45 million in national funding plus 11.5 million in EC co-funding.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. quantera.eu site footer; PDF full text searched, no notice: (c) Quantera. (site footer; the PDF itself carries no copyright or reuse notice)

Collection of use cases gathered by the CEN-CENELEC Focus Group on Quantum Technologies alongside its standardisation roadmap. Each entry, submitted by a research or industry organisation, describes an application, its enabling technologies and any standardisation needs. Examples include using a cloud quantum computer as a secondary processor within a classical pipeline and trapped-ion optical clocks and sensors. The document stresses that use cases matter even when they imply no immediate standard.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: No reuse licence stated by the publisher. PDF checked in full text (no notice); site legal notice not checked: No copyright or reuse notice found in the PDF. Archive copy kept under the owner's decision of 27 October 2026 (the portal succeeds qt.eu); official source linked. An archive copy is kept on the portal owner's decision of 27 October 2026, as the portal succeeds qt.eu; the publisher states no reuse licence. Official source: https://www.cencenelec.eu/media/CEN-CENELEC/AreasOfWork/CEN-CENELEC_Top….

Group report preparing the ground for standardising the components and internal interfaces of quantum key distribution systems. Regardless of the underlying technology, it identifies devices common to most QKD systems, from photon sources and detectors to classical protocol-processing hardware and operating systems, lists properties of these components that should later be standardised, and catalogues requirements for the interfaces between them.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2018. All rights reserved.

Analyses how long symmetric ciphers and hash functions remain secure against quantum attack using Grover's algorithm. It models an optimistic commercial quantum computer around 2050 and an idealised worst-case machine, accounts for error-correction and parallelisation overheads, and concludes that 256-bit keys such as AES-256 should stay safe well beyond 2050, while advising industry to find and plan to replace products relying on 128-bit or shorter keys.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2017. All rights reserved.

Applies a simplified threat assessment, based on the method in ETSI TS 102 165-1, to a set of use cases exposed to quantum computing attacks. The report states its assumptions about when practical quantum computers might be deployed, while holding that they will become viable eventually, and examines the consequences for the cryptography used in several existing industrial deployment scenarios.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2017. All rights reserved.

Group report summarising academic and industrial understanding of quantum-safe cryptography as it stood in 2016. It identifies candidate primitives for key establishment and authentication that could be standardised by ETSI, sets out the primitive types under consideration and a framework for assessing them, discusses representative schemes in turn, and closes with a preliminary look at key sizes.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) European Telecommunications Standards Institute 2016. All rights reserved.

Discusses hybrid cryptography that pairs traditional and post-quantum algorithms for key establishment and digital signatures. The report explains motivations for hybrids, clarifies the terminology, weighs security, efficiency and agility trade-offs, highlights factors in choosing algorithm and parameter combinations, covers deployment and migration issues, and identifies when hybrids should give way to purely post-quantum algorithms. It explicitly does not advise whether hybrids should be used.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2024. All rights reserved.

Reviews how an attacker with a cryptographically relevant quantum computer affects the security proofs of cryptographic protocols that run on classical hardware. For each affected system it classifies the situation: a quantum-aware replacement proof exists, possibly with lower security; security is still expected without a new proof; a break is expected though no concrete attack is known; or a concrete quantum attack already defeats it.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2024. All rights reserved.

Study of cryptographic protection in Intelligent Transport Systems and Cooperative ITS, assessing how exposed the deployed security mechanisms are to attack by a quantum computer. It reviews the current state of cryptographic deployment in vehicle and roadside communication and sets out recommendations for adopting quantum-safe cryptography so that these transport systems reduce their exposure.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2023. All rights reserved.

Addresses the practical risks of stateful hash-based signature schemes, whose security depends on never reusing a state index. The report characterises the state object and the vulnerabilities and operational failures that poor state handling can cause, offers guidance on mitigating them, and helps implementers judge whether such a scheme fits their application, with examples of suitable and unsuitable deployments.

Summary written by a portal editor from the public document; it is not AI-generated. The original document is authoritative.

Licence: Publisher copyright, no reuse licence. PDF p.2 (Copyright Notification): No part may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means ... except as authorized by written permission of ETSI. (c) ETSI 2021. All rights reserved.