In short: Every standard and PQC deadline with its status and next milestone. Filter by body, kind or status; each item shows its key facts first and folds its milestones and sources. Filter the tracker
Information only, not compliance or legal advice. Each status, date and deadline is as its official source states it on the date read; check the publisher for the authoritative current version. A milestone that is not verified is never used in the deadlines view, the feed, the early warning or the briefings.
Standards, specifications, committees and migration deadlines on post-quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution and quantum technologies: ETSI, CEN-CENELEC, ISO/IEC, ITU-T, IEEE, NIST and the IETF, the EU roadmap and the national agencies, each with its status and dates, its scope, what it means for organisations and its next milestone.
This page: every standard, committee and deadline with its status and next milestone. The other post-quantum pages: Guide: what post-quantum cryptography is and what to do first; Timeline by authority: the milestones of each EU and national authority, as its source states them; What is due when: everything due in the next 12 to 60 months, in date order, with a calendar feed; Compliance calendar: dated obligations and milestones beyond post-quantum.
Verification of the items on the date read: Verified: 57; Partly verified: 20; Not verified: 2.
8 items
FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Standard
Status
Published (2024-08-13). Final published 2024-08-13 (draft 2023-08-24); planning note 2025-11-17 announces a future update/revision to correct an identified issue, no date given
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Defines ML-KEM, the primary NIST post-quantum key-establishment algorithm that products and protocols are adopting for key exchange.
26 reviewed product assertions name an algorithm it specifies: Botan project Botan, Canonical (Ubuntu) Ubuntu, Entrust Entrust nShield HSM (Security World), Fortinet Fortinet FortiOS (FortiGate), Google Google Cloud Key Management Service, Keyfactor (EJBCA) Keyfactor EJBCA, Legion of the Bouncy Castle Bouncy Castle for Java, Microsoft .NET, Microsoft Windows Server, Mozilla Mozilla NSS (Network Security Services), Node.js project (OpenJS Foundation) Node.js, Open Quantum Safe project liboqs (Open Quantum Safe), OpenJDK project OpenJDK (Java SE), OpenSSL Project OpenSSL, PQShield PQShield PQCryptoLib-Core, Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Thales Thales Luna Network HSM 7, The Go project Go (crypto/tls and crypto packages), Utimaco Utimaco u.trust General Purpose HSM Se-Series, strongSwan project strongSwan, wolfSSL wolfSSL. Vendor statements, not certification.
Verification
Verified. Status, release date and the 2025-11-17 planning note (future update/revision, errata spreadsheet) read on the CSRC publication page; no revision draft is published and no revision date is stated.
FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Standard
Status
Published (2024-08-13). Final published 2024-08-13 (draft 2023-08-24); 2026-07-31 note links an errata list of minor issues to be corrected in a future update/revision, no date given
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Defines ML-DSA, the primary NIST post-quantum digital signature algorithm for certificates, code signing and authentication.
28 reviewed product assertions name an algorithm it specifies: Amazon Web Services AWS Key Management Service, Botan project Botan, Canonical (Ubuntu) Ubuntu, Cloudflare Cloudflare network, Entrust Entrust nShield HSM (Security World), GnuTLS project GnuTLS, Google Google Cloud Key Management Service, Keyfactor (EJBCA) Keyfactor EJBCA, Legion of the Bouncy Castle Bouncy Castle for Java, Microsoft .NET, Microsoft Windows Server, Mozilla Mozilla NSS (Network Security Services), Node.js project (OpenJS Foundation) Node.js, Open Quantum Safe project liboqs (Open Quantum Safe), OpenJDK project OpenJDK (Java SE), OpenSSL Project OpenSSL, PQShield PQShield PQCryptoLib-Core, Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Securosys Securosys Primus HSM, Thales Thales Luna Network HSM 7, The Go project Go (crypto/tls and crypto packages), Utimaco Utimaco u.trust General Purpose HSM Se-Series, wolfSSL wolfSSL. Vendor statements, not certification.
Verification
Verified. Status, release date and the 2026-07-31 errata/future-revision note read on the CSRC page; no revision draft is published and no revision date is stated.
FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Standard
Status
Published (2024-08-13). Final published 2024-08-13 (draft 2023-08-24); no revision notice listed; related draft SP 800-230 (additional SLH-DSA parameter sets) released 2026-04-13
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Defines SLH-DSA, a hash-based signature algorithm offering a conservative alternative to lattice-based signatures.
10 reviewed product assertions name an algorithm it specifies: Botan project Botan, Canonical (Ubuntu) Ubuntu, Entrust Entrust nShield HSM (Security World), Google Google Cloud Key Management Service, Legion of the Bouncy Castle Bouncy Castle for Java, Microsoft .NET, OpenSSL Project OpenSSL, Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Utimaco Utimaco u.trust General Purpose HSM Se-Series. Vendor statements, not certification.
Verification
Verified. Status and date read on the CSRC page; no planning note or revision listed. SP 800-230 ipd date read on the PQC workshops and timeline page.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Specification
Status
In development. No initial public draft published as of 2026-10-25; FALCON listed as 'FIPS coming soon'
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
A compact lattice-based signature standard is still pending, so products needing small signatures cannot yet rely on a NIST-final FN-DSA.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Verification
Partly verified. Absence of a draft confirmed on three official pages today: FIPS publications list has no FIPS 206 entry, the selected-algorithms page labels FALCON 'FIPS coming soon', and the presumed draft URL csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/206/ipd returned 404. The March 2025 NIST news release says the FALCON draft would be released 'shortly as FIPS 206' but gives no date. No comment period exists to report.
HQC (planned FIPS): HQC selected for standardization (NIST IR 8545 rationale)
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Work item or project
Status
In development (2025-03-11). Selected 2025-03-11; draft standard not published as of 2026-10-25 ('FIPS coming soon'); NIST stated a draft in about a year and a final in 2027
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Provides a code-based backup KEM to ML-KEM, but organisations cannot yet implement against a published HQC draft or final standard.
Partly verified. Selection date and 2027 expectation read today. The news release foresaw a draft for public comment 'in about a year' (about March 2026) with a 90-day comment period; no draft is listed on the FIPS publications page, the drafts-open-for-comment page or the selected-algorithms page, and csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/207/ipd returned 404. The FIPS 207 number appears only in a 2025 NIST conference presentation found by search, not on a publication page, so no draft date or comment deadline exists to report.
NIST IR 8547 ipd: Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Migration deadlines
Status
Draft (2024-11-12). Initial public draft released 2024-11-12; comments closed 2025-01-10; still ipd on 2026-10-25 (comments received posted); no final
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Signals that NIST plans to deprecate 112-bit quantum-vulnerable RSA, ECC and DH after 2030 and disallow all of them after 2035, which sets the planning horizon for US federal and FIPS-validated systems. Its 2030 and 2035 dates are proposals of an initial public draft, shown as targets, not as deadlines, until NIST publishes a final version.
Next milestone
: Proposed (draft, not final): quantum-vulnerable algorithms at 112-bit strength deprecated (112-bit security strength (RSA, ECDSA, finite-field and EC DH/MQV)) · Target date · NIST: NIST IR 8547 ipd (PDF) (read 2026-10-25; Section 4.1.1 Table 2 (signatures) and Section 4.1.2 Table 4 (key establishment))
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: IPD comment period closed
: Proposed (draft, not final): quantum-vulnerable algorithms at 112-bit strength deprecated (112-bit security strength (RSA, ECDSA, finite-field and EC DH/MQV))
: Proposed (draft, not final): quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment algorithms disallowed (All security strengths (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH, MQV))
Verified. Draft status, release date and comment close read on the CSRC page; 2030/2035 transition dates read in the ipd PDF text (Tables 2 and 4). No final version is listed.
NIST: NIST IR 8547 ipd (PDF) (read 2026-10-25; Section 4.1.1 Table 2 (signatures) and Section 4.1.2 Table 4 (key establishment))
NIST IR 8610: Status Report on the Second Round of the Additional Digital Signature Schemes for the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Technical report
Status
Published (2026-05-14). Final 2026-05-14; nine candidates advanced to round 3 (FAEST, HAWK, MAYO, MQOM, QR-UOV, SDitH, SNOVA, SQIsign, UOV)
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Narrows the additional signature on-ramp to nine round-3 candidates, so further NIST signature standards beyond ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and FN-DSA remain some years away.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: Round 2 status report; round 3 candidates announced
Verification
Verified. Report status, date and round-3 candidate list read on the CSRC page; no round-3 end date is stated.