In short: Every standard and PQC deadline with its status and next milestone. Filter by body, kind or status; each item shows its key facts first and folds its milestones and sources. Filter the tracker
Information only, not compliance or legal advice. Each status, date and deadline is as its official source states it on the date read; check the publisher for the authoritative current version. A milestone that is not verified is never used in the deadlines view, the feed, the early warning or the briefings.
Standards, specifications, committees and migration deadlines on post-quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution and quantum technologies: ETSI, CEN-CENELEC, ISO/IEC, ITU-T, IEEE, NIST and the IETF, the EU roadmap and the national agencies, each with its status and dates, its scope, what it means for organisations and its next milestone.
This page: every standard, committee and deadline with its status and next milestone. The other post-quantum pages: Guide: what post-quantum cryptography is and what to do first; Timeline by authority: the milestones of each EU and national authority, as its source states them; What is due when: everything due in the next 12 to 60 months, in date order, with a calendar feed; Compliance calendar: dated obligations and milestones beyond post-quantum.
Verified. Title, version and publication date read today on the ETSI Work Programme list for TC CYBER QSC; version folder confirmed in the ETSI deliver archive. Titles are reconstructed from line-wrapped table cells.
ETSI TR 103 619: Cyber Security (CYBER); Quantum-Safe Cryptography (QSC); Migration strategies and recommendations to Quantum Safe schemes
Body
ETSI Technical Committee CYBER (Quantum-Safe Cryptography)
Kind
Technical report
Status
Published (2020-07-21). V1.1.1 published 2020-07-21
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
International
What it means for organisations
Outlines a staged migration approach (inventory, plan, execution) that organisations can use to structure a move to quantum-safe cryptography.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: V1.1.1 published
Verification
Verified. Title, version and publication date read today on the ETSI Work Programme list for TC CYBER QSC; version folder confirmed in the ETSI deliver archive. Titles are reconstructed from line-wrapped table cells.
ETSI TR 104 016: Cyber Security (CYBER); Quantum-Safe Cryptography (QSC); A Repeatable Framework for Quantum-Safe Migrations
Body
ETSI Technical Committee CYBER (Quantum-Safe Cryptography)
Kind
Technical report
Status
Published (2024-10-25). V1.1.1 published 2024-10-25
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
International
What it means for organisations
Provides a repeatable framework that organisations can apply to plan and run successive quantum-safe migration projects.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: V1.1.1 published
Verification
Verified. Title, version and publication date read today on the ETSI Work Programme list for TC CYBER QSC; version folder confirmed in the ETSI deliver archive. Titles are reconstructed from line-wrapped table cells.
ETSI TS 104 015: Cyber Security (CYBER); Quantum-Safe Cryptography (QSC); Efficient Quantum-Safe Hybrid Key Exchanges with Hidden Access Policies
Body
ETSI Technical Committee CYBER (Quantum-Safe Cryptography)
Kind
Specification
Status
Published (2025-02-26). V1.1.1 published 2025-02-26
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
International
What it means for organisations
Specifies a hybrid key encapsulation scheme with attribute-based access control, relevant to data-sharing systems needing quantum-safe access policies.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: V1.1.1 published
Verification
Verified. Title, version and publication date read today on the ETSI Work Programme list for TC CYBER QSC; version folder confirmed in the ETSI deliver archive. Titles are reconstructed from line-wrapped table cells.
IEEE P1943: Standard for Post-Quantum Network Security
Body
IEEE Standards Association
Kind
Work item or project
Status
In development (2022-06-16). Active PAR, approved 2022-06-16 (COM/NetSoft-SC, QuNET/WG)
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
International
What it means for organisations
Would specify how existing network security protocols can be run in post-quantum and hybrid modes.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Verification
Partly verified. Title, status and PAR approval date read on the project page. The PAR expiry is only on the IEEE myProject PAR detail page, which returned HTTP 502.
IEEE P1947: Standard for Quantum Cybersecurity Framework
Body
IEEE Standards Association
Kind
Work item or project
Status
In development (2024-03-21). Active PAR, approved 2024-03-21 (COM/NetSoft-SC)
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
International
What it means for organisations
Would describe quantum-era threat vectors to data security and matching defence mechanisms in one framework.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Verification
Partly verified. Title, status, committee and PAR approval date read on the project page. PAR expiry not shown there; PAR detail page returned HTTP 502.
FIPS 203: Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism Standard
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Standard
Status
Published (2024-08-13). Final published 2024-08-13 (draft 2023-08-24); planning note 2025-11-17 announces a future update/revision to correct an identified issue, no date given
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Defines ML-KEM, the primary NIST post-quantum key-establishment algorithm that products and protocols are adopting for key exchange.
26 reviewed product assertions name an algorithm it specifies: Botan project Botan, Canonical (Ubuntu) Ubuntu, Entrust Entrust nShield HSM (Security World), Fortinet Fortinet FortiOS (FortiGate), Google Google Cloud Key Management Service, Keyfactor (EJBCA) Keyfactor EJBCA, Legion of the Bouncy Castle Bouncy Castle for Java, Microsoft .NET, Microsoft Windows Server, Mozilla Mozilla NSS (Network Security Services), Node.js project (OpenJS Foundation) Node.js, Open Quantum Safe project liboqs (Open Quantum Safe), OpenJDK project OpenJDK (Java SE), OpenSSL Project OpenSSL, PQShield PQShield PQCryptoLib-Core, Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Thales Thales Luna Network HSM 7, The Go project Go (crypto/tls and crypto packages), Utimaco Utimaco u.trust General Purpose HSM Se-Series, strongSwan project strongSwan, wolfSSL wolfSSL. Vendor statements, not certification.
Verification
Verified. Status, release date and the 2025-11-17 planning note (future update/revision, errata spreadsheet) read on the CSRC publication page; no revision draft is published and no revision date is stated.
FIPS 204: Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Standard
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Standard
Status
Published (2024-08-13). Final published 2024-08-13 (draft 2023-08-24); 2026-07-31 note links an errata list of minor issues to be corrected in a future update/revision, no date given
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Defines ML-DSA, the primary NIST post-quantum digital signature algorithm for certificates, code signing and authentication.
28 reviewed product assertions name an algorithm it specifies: Amazon Web Services AWS Key Management Service, Botan project Botan, Canonical (Ubuntu) Ubuntu, Cloudflare Cloudflare network, Entrust Entrust nShield HSM (Security World), GnuTLS project GnuTLS, Google Google Cloud Key Management Service, Keyfactor (EJBCA) Keyfactor EJBCA, Legion of the Bouncy Castle Bouncy Castle for Java, Microsoft .NET, Microsoft Windows Server, Mozilla Mozilla NSS (Network Security Services), Node.js project (OpenJS Foundation) Node.js, Open Quantum Safe project liboqs (Open Quantum Safe), OpenJDK project OpenJDK (Java SE), OpenSSL Project OpenSSL, PQShield PQShield PQCryptoLib-Core, Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Securosys Securosys Primus HSM, Thales Thales Luna Network HSM 7, The Go project Go (crypto/tls and crypto packages), Utimaco Utimaco u.trust General Purpose HSM Se-Series, wolfSSL wolfSSL. Vendor statements, not certification.
Verification
Verified. Status, release date and the 2026-07-31 errata/future-revision note read on the CSRC page; no revision draft is published and no revision date is stated.
FIPS 205: Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Standard
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Standard
Status
Published (2024-08-13). Final published 2024-08-13 (draft 2023-08-24); no revision notice listed; related draft SP 800-230 (additional SLH-DSA parameter sets) released 2026-04-13
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Defines SLH-DSA, a hash-based signature algorithm offering a conservative alternative to lattice-based signatures.
10 reviewed product assertions name an algorithm it specifies: Botan project Botan, Canonical (Ubuntu) Ubuntu, Entrust Entrust nShield HSM (Security World), Google Google Cloud Key Management Service, Legion of the Bouncy Castle Bouncy Castle for Java, Microsoft .NET, OpenSSL Project OpenSSL, Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Utimaco Utimaco u.trust General Purpose HSM Se-Series. Vendor statements, not certification.
Verification
Verified. Status and date read on the CSRC page; no planning note or revision listed. SP 800-230 ipd date read on the PQC workshops and timeline page.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Specification
Status
In development. No initial public draft published as of 2026-10-25; FALCON listed as 'FIPS coming soon'
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
A compact lattice-based signature standard is still pending, so products needing small signatures cannot yet rely on a NIST-final FN-DSA.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Verification
Partly verified. Absence of a draft confirmed on three official pages today: FIPS publications list has no FIPS 206 entry, the selected-algorithms page labels FALCON 'FIPS coming soon', and the presumed draft URL csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/206/ipd returned 404. The March 2025 NIST news release says the FALCON draft would be released 'shortly as FIPS 206' but gives no date. No comment period exists to report.
HQC (planned FIPS): HQC selected for standardization (NIST IR 8545 rationale)
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Work item or project
Status
In development (2025-03-11). Selected 2025-03-11; draft standard not published as of 2026-10-25 ('FIPS coming soon'); NIST stated a draft in about a year and a final in 2027
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Provides a code-based backup KEM to ML-KEM, but organisations cannot yet implement against a published HQC draft or final standard.
Partly verified. Selection date and 2027 expectation read today. The news release foresaw a draft for public comment 'in about a year' (about March 2026) with a 90-day comment period; no draft is listed on the FIPS publications page, the drafts-open-for-comment page or the selected-algorithms page, and csrc.nist.gov/pubs/fips/207/ipd returned 404. The FIPS 207 number appears only in a 2025 NIST conference presentation found by search, not on a publication page, so no draft date or comment deadline exists to report.
NIST IR 8547 ipd: Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography Standards
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Migration deadlines
Status
Draft (2024-11-12). Initial public draft released 2024-11-12; comments closed 2025-01-10; still ipd on 2026-10-25 (comments received posted); no final
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Signals that NIST plans to deprecate 112-bit quantum-vulnerable RSA, ECC and DH after 2030 and disallow all of them after 2035, which sets the planning horizon for US federal and FIPS-validated systems. Its 2030 and 2035 dates are proposals of an initial public draft, shown as targets, not as deadlines, until NIST publishes a final version.
Next milestone
: Proposed (draft, not final): quantum-vulnerable algorithms at 112-bit strength deprecated (112-bit security strength (RSA, ECDSA, finite-field and EC DH/MQV)) · Target date · NIST: NIST IR 8547 ipd (PDF) (read 2026-10-25; Section 4.1.1 Table 2 (signatures) and Section 4.1.2 Table 4 (key establishment))
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: IPD comment period closed
: Proposed (draft, not final): quantum-vulnerable algorithms at 112-bit strength deprecated (112-bit security strength (RSA, ECDSA, finite-field and EC DH/MQV))
: Proposed (draft, not final): quantum-vulnerable signature and key-establishment algorithms disallowed (All security strengths (RSA, ECDSA, EdDSA, DH, MQV))
Verified. Draft status, release date and comment close read on the CSRC page; 2030/2035 transition dates read in the ipd PDF text (Tables 2 and 4). No final version is listed.
NIST: NIST IR 8547 ipd (PDF) (read 2026-10-25; Section 4.1.1 Table 2 (signatures) and Section 4.1.2 Table 4 (key establishment))
NIST IR 8610: Status Report on the Second Round of the Additional Digital Signature Schemes for the NIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process
Body
National Institute of Standards and Technology (United States)
Kind
Technical report
Status
Published (2026-05-14). Final 2026-05-14; nine candidates advanced to round 3 (FAEST, HAWK, MAYO, MQOM, QR-UOV, SDitH, SNOVA, SQIsign, UOV)
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Narrows the additional signature on-ramp to nine round-3 candidates, so further NIST signature standards beyond ML-DSA, SLH-DSA and FN-DSA remain some years away.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: Round 2 status report; round 3 candidates announced
Verification
Verified. Report status, date and round-3 candidate list read on the CSRC page; no round-3 end date is stated.
18 reviewed product assertions name an algorithm it specifies: Amazon Web Services AWS Key Management Service, Apple Apple iOS and iPadOS, Apple Apple macOS, Botan project Botan, Cloudflare Cloudflare network, GnuTLS project GnuTLS, Google Google Chrome, Mozilla Mozilla Firefox, Mozilla Mozilla NSS (Network Security Services), OpenJDK project OpenJDK (Java SE), OpenSSL Project OpenSSL, Red Hat Red Hat Enterprise Linux, SUSE SUSE Linux Enterprise Server, The Go project Go (crypto/tls and crypto packages). Vendor statements, not certification.
Verification
Verified. Number, title, status, month and source draft read on datatracker; title and status confirmed on rfc-editor.org (which shows only the year 2026).
draft-ietf-tls-mlkem-11: ML-KEM Post-Quantum Key Agreement for TLS 1.3
Body
Internet Engineering Task Force
Kind
Specification
Status
In development (2026-09-16). Version 11 (2026-09-16); IESG state RFC Ed Queue, awaiting first edit; intended Informational; no RFC number yet
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
International
What it means for organisations
Pure ML-KEM key agreement for TLS 1.3 is approved and in the RFC Editor queue, offering a non-hybrid option once published.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: Version -11 posted
Verification
Verified. Version, IESG/RFC Editor state, intended status and dates read on datatracker. No expected RFC publication date is stated. Re-checked on 27 October 2026 through the datatracker JSON API (doc/document and newrevisiondocevent): revision 11 is still the latest, posted 2026-09-17 04:19 UTC (16 September in US time); the document record was last changed on 2026-10-12 by a state change, not by a new revision.
draft-ietf-lamps-pq-composite-sigs-19: Composite Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm (ML-DSA) for use in X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
Body
Internet Engineering Task Force
Kind
Specification
Status
In development (2026-04-21). Version 19 (2026-04-21); IESG state RFC Ed Queue, RFC Editor state blocked pending final approval; intended Proposed Standard; no RFC number yet
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
International
What it means for organisations
Composite ML-DSA plus traditional signatures for X.509 are approved and queued for publication, supporting hybrid certificate migration strategies.
Verified. Version, states and dates read on datatracker; the page shows an expiry date of 23 October 2026 while the document sits in the RFC Editor queue (queue documents do not lapse in practice). No expected RFC date is stated. Re-checked on 27 October 2026 through the datatracker JSON API: revision 19 (posted 2026-04-21) is still the latest; the record was last changed on 2026-10-20 by a state change, not by a new revision.
Partly verified. The Commission library page and the PQC policy page returned HTTP 403 to both WebFetch and curl today, so the exact 23 June 2025 date and any Part 2 publication could not be read there. Milestones and 'released (June 2025)' were read in a Commission presentation hosted on enisa.europa.eu (April 2026); its slide 6 prints the 2030 milestone as '21/12/2030', while slide 7 says 'End of 2030', so 2030-12-31 is used. A search snippet of the policy page mentions a second supplementary deliverable in preparation, but this could not be read on the page and no publication date is confirmed.
Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101: Commission Recommendation (EU) 2024/1101 of 11 April 2024 on a Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography
Body
European Union (Commission and NIS Cooperation Group)
Kind
Recommendation
Status
Active (2024-04-12). Adopted 2024-04-11, published OJ L 2024/1101 on 2024-04-12; effects to be assessed at most three years after publication
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
European Union
What it means for organisations
Created the NIS Cooperation Group PQC sub-group and the mandate for the coordinated roadmap, with an assessment of its effects due by 12 April 2027.
Verified. Title, adoption date, OJ date and review clause (point 11, section 4) read in the official OJ text served by the EU Publications Office (EUR-Lex itself returned an empty 202 challenge). The review date 2027-04-12 is computed from the stated 'three years after publication' and the 12.4.2024 publication date.
ECCG Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms v3 (draft): ECCG Agreed Cryptographic Mechanisms - version 3 - draft for public review
Body
European Cybersecurity Certification Group and ENISA (EUCC)
Kind
Specification
Status
Draft (2026-06-02). Draft for public review posted 2026-06-02 with change log; review open until end of July 2026; not yet adopted as of 2026-10-25
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
European Union
What it means for organisations
Signals the next revision of the EUCC agreed mechanisms list; v2 remains the applicable version until v3 is adopted.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: Version 3 draft for public review posted
: Public review closed
Verification
Verified. Draft posting date, review end and continued 'applicable version' status of v2 read on the ENISA page. No adoption date for v3 is stated. The same page also lists an ENISA report on hybridisation of traditional cryptography with PQC dated 30 April 2026.
ANSSI PQC page and PQC FAQ (cyber.gouv.fr): Cryptographie post-quantique (PQC) / FaQ sur la Cryptographie post-quantique (PQC)
Body
ANSSI (France)
Kind
Migration deadlines
Status
Active. Pages exist on cyber.gouv.fr but could not be read today (bot-protection interstitial); content and dates unconfirmed
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
France
What it means for organisations
Would set the years from which PQC becomes a condition for French product qualification and when classical-only products stop being a reasonable purchase.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Verification
Not verified. Both cyber.gouv.fr pages (FR and EN) returned an Incapsula bot-protection interstitial to WebFetch and curl; no bypass attempted. Search-engine snippets (not read on the page) suggested ANSSI aims at PQC obligations for entry into qualification for at least some product types from 2027, and considers buying non-PQC products after 2030 unreasonable; these years are NOT recorded as milestones because they were not read on the official page today. The 2025/2026 per-year qualification schedule asked for (2025/2026/2027, after 2030) could not be confirmed.
: Aim for post-quantum security for mechanisms used beyond this date or exposed to retroactive attack (RecoSécuLongTerme)
: 2048-bit minimum modulus acceptable only for use up to end of 2030; 3072 bits from 2031 (RSA factorisation and finite-field discrete-log moduli (RègleFactorisation))
Verification
Verified. PDF downloaded from messervices.cyber.gouv.fr and text extracted; version, date and both rules read directly. The 2030-12-31 row is a classical key-size limit, included because it is a dated end-of-use rule in the same guide.
ANSSI PQC position paper (2022) and follow-up (2023): ANSSI views on the Post-Quantum Cryptography transition / Avis de l'ANSSI sur la migration vers la cryptographie post-quantique (suivi 2023)
Body
ANSSI (France)
Kind
Migration deadlines
Status
Published (2023-12-21). 2022 position paper; follow-up dated 21 December 2023 accelerates the agenda
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
France
What it means for organisations
Describes the phased French approach to security visas, with hybrid PQC expected for products protecting information beyond 2030.
: First French security visas for products with hybrid PQC expected
: ANSSI position: hybrid PQC for products protecting confidentiality beyond 2030 or used after 2030
Verification
Verified. 2022 page on messervices read via WebFetch (page dated 4 January 2022); 2023 follow-up PDF downloaded and text extracted (dated 21 December 2023). These are earlier positions; the newer 2025/2026 product timeline on cyber.gouv.fr could not be read (see separate item). The 2024 row stands for the stated range 2024-2025.
Leitlinie zur Umstellung auf PQC (BMI/BMDS/BSI, Artikelnummer BMI26024): Nationale Umsetzung der EU-Roadmap zur Umstellung auf Post-Quanten-Kryptografie
Body
BSI (Germany)
Kind
Migration deadlines
Status
Published (2026-10-12). Joint guideline of BMDS, BMI and BSI; document header dated 11 September 2026 (Stand August 2026); published with BSI press release of 12.10.2026
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
Germany
What it means for organisations
Transfers the EU roadmap's risk-based deadlines into a German national timeline for administrations, critical infrastructure operators and companies.
Next milestone
: Initial preparation and planning phase (PQC readiness) complete and first migration steps started · Deadline · BSI: Nationale Umsetzung der EU-Roadmap zur Umstellung auf Post-Quanten-Kryptografie (PDF) (read 2026-10-25; Header (11. September 2026); section 3 Zeitplan; section 4 intro; 4.1 Fristen verbindlich machen; inventory subsection; Impressum (Stand August 2026))
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: Initial preparation and planning phase (PQC readiness) complete and first migration steps started
: Initial cryptographic inventory complete
: Responsible bodies (e.g. IT-Planungsrat, UP KRITIS) adopt the deadlines as binding where possible
: High-risk use cases quantum-safe (High risk)
: Medium-risk use cases quantum-safe; transition largely complete for nearly all systems (Medium risk)
Verified. Guideline PDF (646 KB) retrieved from bsi.bund.de and text extracted; dates read in the summary box, section 3 'Zeitplan', section 4 intro, 4.1 and the inventory subsection. Press release read for publication date. The PDF calls the deadlines urgent recommendations, not legally binding.
BSI TR-02102-1 Version 2026-01: Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen
Body
BSI (Germany)
Kind
Migration deadlines
Status
Published (2026-01-23). Version 2026-01 (Stand 23 January 2026) adds migration deadlines and announces end of sole use of classical asymmetric schemes
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
Germany
What it means for organisations
Gives German product and system designers dates after which classical key agreement and, later, classical signatures are recommended only in hybrid combination with PQC.
Next milestone
: Switch to quantum-safe key agreement for very high protection needs (Applications with very high protection needs) · Deadline · BSI: TR-02102-1 Kryptographische Verfahren: Empfehlungen und Schlüssellängen (PDF) (read 2026-10-25; Cover and version table (2026-01, 23.01.2026); section 2.1 Einsatz quantensicherer Verfahren; section 2.3 Klassische asymmetrische Verfahren)
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: Switch to quantum-safe key agreement for very high protection needs (Applications with very high protection needs)
: End of the period in which the guideline lists classical key agreement on its own; hybrid with a PQC KEM afterwards (Key agreement / encryption)
: Classical signature schemes expected to remain in the guideline only until the end of 2035 (Signatures)
Verified. TR PDF downloaded from bsi.bund.de and text extracted; version table and sections 2.1 and 2.3 read. Press release of 11.02.2026 confirms the same three dates. The new guideline cites a TR-02102-1 edition dated December 2026, which is not yet available; the current file is version 2026-01.
Netherlands government (NLNCSA, AIVD and ministries)
Kind
Migration deadlines
Status
Published (2026-10-05). Government-wide quantum strategy presented by the Cabinet on 5 October 2026; contains the PQC migration timeline for the Rijksoverheid (reviewed annually by programme Quantumveilige Cryptografie NL)
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
Netherlands
What it means for organisations
Sets yearly PQC migration targets for Dutch central government organisations aligned with the EU roadmap, ending with medium-risk use cases by end-2035.
Next milestone
: Quantum risk in risk management; own cryptography policy per Rijksbreed Beleidskader Cryptografie · Target date · Rijksoverheid (open.overheid.nl): Rijksbrede Quantumstrategie (PDF) (read 2026-10-25; Section 4.1.1 Voorbereiden van de Rijksoverheid op de quantumdreiging, box 'PQC-migratie tijdpad voor de Nederlandse Rijksoverheid' (page 36))
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Dated milestones
: Quantum risk in risk management; own cryptography policy per Rijksbreed Beleidskader Cryptografie
: HNDL mitigations; (draft) PQC migration planning and pilots; crypto asset management; staffing and budget insight
: PQC requirements in procurement; guidance and policy for essential entities
: PQC migration of high-risk use cases completed; software and firmware quantum-safe by default (High risk)
: PQC migration of medium-risk use cases completed (Medium risk)
: PQC migration of low-risk use cases completed as far as possible (Low risk)
Verification
Verified. Strategy PDF from open.overheid.nl retrieved and text extracted; timeline box read in section 4.1.1. Presentation date read on the rijksoverheid.nl news item (5 October 2026). The document is from the Cabinet (lead ministry EZK, timeline coordinated by BZK), not from NLNCSA or AIVD; it is grouped under nlncsa as the Dutch national entry. The text says the government strives to follow this timeline and that it may be adjusted.
: Develop an initial departmental PQC migration plan
: Report on PQC migration progress (annual)
: Completion of PQC migration of high priority systems (High priority systems)
: Completion of PQC migration of remaining systems (Remaining systems)
Verification
Verified. Page read on cyber.gc.ca. Scope is non-classified systems (UNCLASSIFIED, PROTECTED A, PROTECTED B); classified and PROTECTED C systems need separate Cyber Centre advice. Section 4 notes that meeting milestones means disabling, isolating or tunnelling quantum-vulnerable algorithms.
TBS Security Policy Implementation Notice (SPIN) on PQC migration: Migrating the Government of Canada to Post-Quantum Cryptography: Security Policy Implementation Notice
Body
Government of Canada (Canadian Centre for Cyber Security; Treasury Board Secretariat)
Kind
Migration deadlines
Status
Active (2025-10-09). Effective 9 October 2025
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
Canada
What it means for organisations
Turns the Cyber Centre roadmap into dated obligations for federal departments and Shared Services Canada, including PQC clauses in new contracts.
: PQC procurement clauses in contracts for digital components entered after this date (Procurement)
: Plans updated to guide Phase 2
: System records updated, high-priority systems identified, Phase 3 plans, transition of systems begins
: PQC migration of high-priority systems complete (High priority systems)
: PQC migration of remaining systems complete (Remaining systems)
Verification
Verified. Page read on canada.ca. Issued by the Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, not by the Cyber Centre; grouped under cccs only because the schema has no separate Canadian policy body. It cites ITSM.40.001.
CNSA 2.0: Announcing the Commercial National Security Algorithm Suite 2.0
Body
National Security Agency (United States)
Kind
Migration deadlines
Status
Active. Official documents could not be read today (HTTP 403 from media.defense.gov and nsa.gov)
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
United States
What it means for organisations
Would set per-category years by which US National Security Systems support, prefer and then exclusively use quantum-resistant CNSA 2.0 algorithms.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Verification
Not verified. All official URLs returned HTTP 403 to WebFetch and curl today: CSA PDF (2022 and May 2025 versions on media.defense.gov), CNSA 2.0 FAQ (v2.2 and earlier), NSA PQC resource hub and NSA press release on nsa.gov, and the CSfC PQC addendum. No per-category 'support and prefer by' / 'exclusively use by' years, the 2035 NSM-10 goal, or the CNSSP 15 / 1 January 2027 acquisition requirement could be read on an official page, so no milestones are recorded. Search-engine snippets (unverified, not used) mentioned 2025/2030 for software and firmware signing, 2027/2033 for operating systems, 2033 for custom and legacy equipment, 1 January 2027 for new NSS acquisitions, and 2035 overall; these need re-checking from a network that can reach media.defense.gov. Tried again on 27 October 2026: both media.defense.gov PDFs still answered HTTP 403, so CNSA 2.0 stays not verified and no date is shown; an editor reading the advisory in a normal browser can add the milestones with their page locator.
IEEE P3172: Recommended Practice for Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration
Body
IEEE Standards Association
Kind
Work item or project
Status
Withdrawn (2025-11-04). PAR withdrawn by the SASB on 2025-11-04 (C/CPSC)
Scope
Post-quantum cryptography
Jurisdiction
International
What it means for organisations
Leaves no active IEEE recommended practice on PQC migration under this number.
Next milestone
None stated by the sources read.
Milestones, links, verification and sources
Verification
Verified. Title and withdrawal read on the SASB board actions page of 4 November 2025. The original PAR approval (May 2022) was seen only in search results, not on a fetched page.